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FEATURE COMMENT: Section 809 And
‘e-Portal’ Proposals, By Cutting Bid
Protests In Federal Procurement, Could
Breach International Agreements And
Raise New Risks Of Corruption
Bid protests—vendors’ challenges to contracting
officials’ errors, either before or after award—have
been an established part of federal procurement
for at least a century. Protests (sometimes called
“challenges” or “remedies proceedings” abroad) are
a recognized bulwark against corruption in the U.S.,
and have become a standard part of procurement
systems around the world, often at the urging of
the U.S.
But new proposals being considered for U.S.
Government procurement in practice could dramatically limit bid protests in the name of streamlining
the procurement process. This drastic change to U.S.
procurement practices could violate international
agreements under which the U.S. has agreed to
maintain an effective bid protest system, and could
raise new risks of corruption in procurement.
Bid Protests: Part of U.S. Procurement for
Nearly a Century—Bid protests have been part
of federal procurement since at least 1926, when
what is now the Government Accountability Office
sustained a vendor’s challenge to overly restrictive
specifications for the procurement of trucks. See
Gordon, “Annals of Accountability: The First Published Bid Protest Decision,” 39 Procurement Law.
11 (2004). By the 1970s, the federal courts had become established alternative channels for protests.
Early bid protests were brought in federal district
court under the Administrative Procedure Act, but
4-204-926-2
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modern bid protests are brought under a statute
that specifically allows the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims to review procurement decisions, 28 USCA
§ 1491(b). See Cibinic, Jr., Nash, Jr. and Yukins,
Formation of Government Contracts, 1673–74 (4th
ed. 2011).
GAO currently handles roughly 2,500 protests
every year, see “GAO Bid Protest Annual Report to
the Congress for Fiscal Year 2017” (GAO-18-237SP),
available at www.gao.gov/assets/690/688362.pdf,
and the COFC hears about 100 protests annually,
see, e.g., COFC, “Statistical Report for the Fiscal
Year October 1, 2016–September 30, 2017,” available at www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
FY17 stats for website.pdf. (Although protests may
be brought directly to the contracting agency as
well, per Federal Acquisition Regulation 33.103,
these “agency-level” protests are commonly viewed
as ineffective and are seldom used in practice.)
There are generally two kinds of federal protests: pre-award protests, and postaward protests
asserting that agency officials made an error in the
award of a contract. See generally Cibinic et al., supra, at 1673–74. Pre-award protests allow vendors
to challenge, for example, terms in a solicitation
that are overly restrictive and thus unreasonably
anticompetitive. Pre-award protests are an important tool in international trade because they allow
foreign vendors (including U.S. vendors competing
abroad) to challenge unfair and anticompetitive requirements. Protests after award are equally important: They allow disappointed bidders to complain
of errors in the process and to point out corruption
that may have infected the procurement.
Bid Protests Have Been Adopted Nationally and Internationally—Because of the important protections they provide against error and
corruption, bid protests have been adopted across
the U.S., and indeed around the world. See, e.g.,
Gordon, “Constructing a Bid Protest Process: The
Choices that Every Procurement Challenge System
Must Make,” 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 427 (2006); Conway,
“State and Local Procurement Law,” ch. 9 (ABA
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2012) (reviewing state and local protest systems).
The European Union requires its member states to
maintain effective bid challenge systems, see EU
Remedies Directive 89/665/EEC, and Directive 92/13/
EEC, as amended through Directive 2007/66/EC, and
the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model procurement law, in
chapter VIII, calls for bid protest systems.
A key international instrument that recognizes bid protests’ role in fighting corruption is the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption. It
has been adopted by the vast majority of nations,
including the U.S.—which played a leading role in
developing the Convention. See UN Office of Drugs
and Crime (UNODC), “United Nations Convention
Against Corruption Signature & Ratification Status as of 3 October 2017,” available at www.unodc.
org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html. The
Convention’s Article 9 was written to call specifically for effective bid protest systems as a means
of discouraging corruption in procurement. See,
e.g., UNODC, “Good Practices in Ensuring Compliance with Article 9 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption” 23–24 (2013); UNODC,
“Travaux Preparatoires of the Negotiations for
the Elaboration of the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption” (2010), available at www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/
Travaux/Travaux_Preparatoires_-_UNCAC_E.pdf.
U.S. Trade Agreements Call for Bid Protest
Protections: As noted, bid protests are also an important part of international trade agreements because they give vendors competing in international
procurement markets a means of challenging unfair
barriers to competition. Following in part the example of the U.S., the leading international agreement
on opening procurement markets, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government
Procurement (GPA), includes provisions requiring
bid protest systems in member states. See WTO,
Revised Agreement on Government Procurement,
Art. XVIII, April 2, 2012, available at www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/rev-gpr-94_01_e.pdf. Those
bid protest systems mandated by the GPA give
“suppliers believing that a procurement has been
handled inconsistently with the requirements of the
GPA a right of recourse to an independent domestic
tribunal.” WTO, “Overview of the Agreement on
Government Procurement,” available at www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpa_overview_e.htm.
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The U.S. has also agreed to include bid protest
measures in many other international agreements,
particularly in free trade agreements (FTAs) that open
procurement markets internationally for U.S. exporters.
See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Free Trade
Agreements, available at ustr.gov/trade-agreements/
free-trade-agreements (links to FTAs); U.S.-Australia
FTA, Art. 15.11(2) (“Each Party shall maintain at least
one impartial administrative or judicial authority that
is independent of its procuring entities to receive and
review challenges that suppliers submit, in accordance
with the Party’s law, relating to a covered procurement.”); U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Art. 9.11(1) (“Each Party
shall provide timely, effective, transparent, and predictable means for a supplier to challenge the conduct of a
covered procurement ....”); U.S.-Dominican RepublicCentral America FTA (CAFTA-DR), Art. 9.15(1) (“Each
Party shall establish or designate at least one impartial administrative or judicial Authority ... to receive
and review challenges that suppliers submit relating
to the obligations of the Party and its entities under
this Chapter ....”); U.S.-Chile FTA, Art. 9.13(1) (“Each
Party shall establish or designate at least one impartial administrative or judicial authority ... to receive
and review challenges that suppliers submit relating
to the Party’s measures implementing this Chapter in
connection with a procurement covered by this Chapter
....”); U.S.-Colombia FTA, Art. 9.11(1) (“Each Party shall
establish or designate at least one impartial administrative or judicial authority that is independent from its
procuring entities to receive and review challenges that
suppliers submit relating to the application by a procuring entity of a Party’s measures implementing this
Chapter ....”); U.S.-Korea FTA, Art. 17.3 (incorporating
by reference GPA challenge provisions); U.S.-Morocco
FTA, Art. 9.12(1) (“Each Party shall permit a supplier
to challenge a Party’s compliance with its measures
implementing this Chapter ....”); North American Free
Trade Agreement, Art. 1017 (“In order to promote fair,
open and impartial procurement procedures, each Party
shall adopt and maintain bid challenge procedures for
procurement covered by this Chapter in accordance with
the following ... (a) each Party shall allow suppliers to
submit bid challenges concerning any aspect of the procurement process, which for the purposes of this Article
begins after an entity has decided on its procurement
requirement and continues through the contract award
....”); U.S.-Oman FTA, Art. 9.11(1) (“Each Party shall
provide timely, effective, transparent, and predictable
means for a supplier to challenge the conduct of a cov© 2018 Thomson Reuters
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ered procurement ....”); U.S.-Panama FTA, Art. 9.15(1)
(same as U.S.-CAFTA FTA); U.S.-Peru FTA, Art. 9.11(1)
(same as U.S.-Colombia FTA); U.S.-Singapore FTA, Art.
13.3(1) (incorporating by reference GPA provisions).
Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements Call
for Bid Protest Protections: Provisions guaranteeing a
right of access to bid protests have also been included
in the U.S.’ many reciprocal defense procurement
agreements with its allies. See www.acq.osd.mil/
dpap/cpic/ic/reciprocal_procurement_memoranda_of_understanding.html (U.S. reciprocal defense
procurement agreements). Defense FAR Supplement
225.003 (listing qualifying countries); DFARS Subpt.
225.8 (implementing provisions).
To ensure open markets, reciprocal defense
procurement agreements guarantee, for example,
that both parties “will have and maintain published
procedures regarding the filing and review of complaints arising in connection with any phase of the
procurement process,” to ensure that “foreign suppliers shall be treated the same as domestic suppliers.” “Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Federal Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Secretary of Defense of the
United States of America Concerning the Principles
Governing Mutual Cooperation in the Research
and Development, Production, Procurement and
Logistic Support of Defense Equipment,” annex 7
§ 6, Oct. 17, 1978, available at www.acq.osd.mil/
dpap/Docs/mou-germany.pdf; see also “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government
of the French Republic Concerning the Principles
Governing Reciprocal Purchases of Defense Equipment,” annex iv, art. 6, May 22, 1978 (parties commit
to maintaining complaints procedures), available
at www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/mou-france.pdf;
“Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Ministry of Defense of Japan Concerning
Reciprocal Defense Procurement,” § 5, ¶ 6, June
4, 2016 (parties commit to maintaining complaint
procedures regarding any phase of defense procurement), available at www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/
EON for Japan. EON for US. US Japan RDP MOU
1.pdf; “Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Government of Australia and the Government of the
United States Concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement,” art. 5 § 6, April 19, 1995 (complaints procedures should ensure equitable consideration), avail© 2018 Thomson Reuters
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able at www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/mou-australia.
pdf; “Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Kingdom of Sweden Relating to
the Principles Governing Mutual Cooperation In the
Defense Procurement Area,” annex 1, art. III § 5, June
11, 1987 (calling for hearing procedures to review
complaints at any phase of procurement), available
at www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/mou-sweden.pdf;
“Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Secretary of State for Defence of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement,” § 5, ¶
5, Dec. 22, 2017 (each party commits to maintaining
complaints procedures), available at www.acq.osd.
mil/dpap/Docs/paic/US-UK RDP MOU signed 22
Dec 2017 USA003826-17.pdf.
Through the reciprocal defense procurement
agreements, the U.S. and its military allies have
agreed to allow protesting vendors—who serve, in
essence, as “whistleblowers” regarding unfair Government actions—to enforce these broad agreements to
open defense markets. These agreements go beyond
mere trade arrangements and are intended to facilitate cooperation and interoperability among allies. See, e.g., Miller, “Is It Time to Reform Reciprocal
Defense Procurement Agreements?,” 39 Pub. Cont.
L.J. 93, 94 (2009). Vendors’ bid protests are, in this
light, part of a comprehensive security strategy by the
U.S. and its allies, because they promote contractor
participation in integrated defense procurements of
military allies.
Recognizing the broader benefits of bid protests,
both in opening trade and in discouraging corruption,
various international organizations have embraced
bid protests in recent years. See, e.g., Anderson and
Müller, “The Revised WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA): Key Design Features and
Significance for Global Trade and Development,” 48
Geo. J. Int’l L. 949, 993 (2018) (noting importance
of bid protest systems in checking corruption internationally). For example, when the World Bank
recently revamped the procurement framework used
for its borrower nations, it expanded its procurementrelated complaint procedures—an informal sort of bid
challenge—through which vendors may bring irregularities and corruption to the Bank’s attention. See,
e.g., World Bank, “World Bank Procurement Regulations for IPF Borrowers,” ¶¶ 3.26–3.31 and Annex
3
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III (rev. 2017), available at policies.worldbank.org/
sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/7ab37ad5cb6e4f4c9c075
55d23cc0c42.pdf; World Bank, “Procurement-Related
Complaints” (2017), available at pubdocs.worldbank.
org/en/975671478891365829/Complaints-GuidanceFINAL-Revised.pdf. These types of reforms, often
inspired or encouraged by the U.S. and its business
community, reflect an accelerating international consensus in favor of bid protest regimes.
Pending Proposals Could Curtail Bid Protests—Despite the growing international support
for bid protests, and despite the U.S.’ central role in
fostering bid protests worldwide, two pending policy
proposals could dramatically reduce the scope of bid
protests available in U.S. federal procurement. The
first, per § 846 of the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018, P.L. 115-91, would
launch a pilot program to allow federal officials to
buy directly from electronic portals. This initiative
could—depending on its implementation—allow procurements to bypass the normal public solicitation
process, and foreclose pre-award protests. The second
set of proposals, from the Section 809 blue-ribbon
panel assessing defense procurement reforms, might
radically streamline off-the-shelf purchasing, which
again could make pre-award protests practically
impossible.
Section 846 e-Commerce Portals: Section 846 of the
FY 2018 NDAA proposes to allow federal purchasing
under the simplified acquisition threshold to be conducted through commercial e-commerce portals. This
initiative could (depending on how it is implemented)
curtail pre-award bid protests if it permits federal purchasers to bypass the normal pre-award publication on
which most pre-award protests are based.
In § 846, Congress tasked the Office of Management and Budget and the General Services Administration with studying how federal agencies could
purchase from commercially available e-commerce
portals. See, e.g., H. Rep. No. 5-4, 115th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Nov. 9, 2017) (conference report). Per Congress’ mandate, OMB and GSA March 16 published
an initial report suggesting three possible models
for implementing § 846: an “e-commerce” model,
under which vendors sell products electronically;
an “e-marketplace” model, through which federal
buyers could access goods and services through
a commercial online marketplace; and an “e-procurement” model, in which a buying organization
would purchase electronic marketplace services
4
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and use those services, in turn, to buy from contracted vendors. See GSA, “Procurement Through
Commercial e-Commerce Portals: Implementation
Plan” at 6 (2018), available at interact.gsa.gov/
sites/default/files/Commercial%20Platform%20
Implementation%20Plan.pdf; GSA, “GSA and OMB
Finalize Joint Implementation Plan for Commercial
e-Commerce Portal Program” (March 16, 2018),
available at www.gsa.gov/about-us/newsroom/
news-releases/gsa-and-omb-finalize-joint-implementation-plan-for-commercial-ecommerce-portalprogram.
If the § 846 initiative results in direct purchases from electronic portals (thus in practice
exempting an entire phase of procurement from
protest), these changes would make it easier for
officials to indulge in pre-award discrimination
and could pose serious questions under the trade
agreements discussed above. Plurilateral, regional
and bilateral trade agreements typically require
(as noted) that vendors be allowed to protest any
“covered” procurement, such as any supply acquisitions over (approximately) $200,000; electronic
portals implemented under § 846 could breach that
promise by making pre-award protests impossible.
The reciprocal defense agreements discussed
above similarly guarantee that protests will be available for “any phase” of a defense procurement; that
guarantee could be breached if large numbers of online purchases by the Department of Defense were, in
practice, exempt from bid protest. The agencies tasked
with implementing § 846, GSA and OMB, seemed to
recognize these trade concerns in their initial report,
which cited potential issues regarding “[e]xisting
trade laws and treaties relevant to implementing
commercial e-commerce.” “Implementation Plan,”
supra, at 8.
If the U.S. Government, in implementing § 846,
chooses to allow rapid direct purchases through
a commercial portal, that radical change in procurement processes—which traditionally call for
public notice before award—could make pre-award
protests impossible, or nearly so. This would have
profound implications under international agreements, as this article discusses, and it also could
affect other initiatives, such as socioeconomic
and sustainability requirements, which rely on a
transparent, accountable notice process to ensure
that ancillary Government goals are met in any
given procurement. See, e.g., GSA, Procurement
© 2018 Thomson Reuters
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Through Commercial e-Commerce Portals: Public
Meeting (Jan. 9, 2018), transcript at 54 (discussing need to meet socioeconomic requirements in
portals); 71–74 (unresolved issues regarding allocations of risk and responsibilities); 79–85 (concerns
raised regarding domestic preferences and treaty
compliance, and accountability through bid protests); 90–91 (concerns regarding compliance with
socioeconomic requirements); 102–103 (open Trade
Agreements Act (TAA) compliance issues); 130–31,
216–17 (special statutory obligations must be met,
such as the TAA, which bars purchases from China
and other countries not members of trade agreements); 226–27 (statutory requirements should not
be bypassed by portals), available at interact.gsa.
gov/sites/default/files/Transcript%20Comml%20
Portal%20Public%20Meeting%20%281092018%29.
pdf. Allowing officials to purchase directly through
electronic portals, bypassing public notice of the
pending procurement, thus has implications that
may carry far beyond the international agreements
that are our focus here.
Section 809 Panel Proposals: The second, parallel group of proposals, which may well be integrated
with the first, has been put forward by the Section 809
panel, a blue-ribbon commission which was tasked by
Congress, through § 809 of the FY 2016 NDAA, P.L.
114-92, to propose reforms to defense procurement
rules. See, e.g., 60 GC ¶ 46.
The panel’s work is proceeding in phases. In
volume one of the panel’s report, published on
January 31, the panel suggested that officials be
allowed to procure commercially available goods
and services—of any value—in a streamlined manner. “Report of the Advisory Panel on Streamlining
and Codifying Acquisition Regulations (Section 809
Panel),” Vol. 1, at 9–10 (Jan. 2018), available at section809panel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/
Sec809Panel_Vol1-Report_Jan18_FINAL.pdf.
In practice, this may mean eliminating pre-award
protests for such commercial items, which (the Section 809 panel reports) represented 18 percent of
DOD purchases by dollar value in FY 2017. Id. at 17.
The panel’s parallel recommendation that bid protests
be largely eliminated for Small Business Innovation
Research program awards, see id. at 193, suggests
that the panel is quite serious in contemplating new
restrictions on bid protests, as part of its broader
recommendations to streamline the procurement
process.
© 2018 Thomson Reuters
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Notably, the policy reasons put forward by the
panel for limiting bid protests—concerns about disruptive bid protests brought by contractors strategically seeking information, see id. at 10, were largely
rebutted by a RAND Corp. report, which was also
called for by Congress. RAND found that defense
awards are seldom protested, that the process is
structured to minimize protests’ disruption, and
that major contractors are unlikely to use protests
as strategic tools. See Arena et al., RAND Corp., “Assessing Bid Protests of U.S. Department of Defense
Procurements: Identifying Issues, Trends, and Drivers,” xi–xviii (2018), available at www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RR2356.html; Stanley, “More
Than Half Of GAO Protests Resolved In Under 30
Days,” Law360 (April 13, 2018) (public presentation by RAND researcher and senior GAO officials),
available at www.law360.com/articles/1033506/
more-than-half-of-gao-protests-resolved-in-under30-days; “RAND Study Finds More DOD Protests,
But No Flood Of Frivolous Protests,” 60 GC ¶ 18. The
Section 809 panel’s concern that contractors bring
protests merely to understand awards they have lost
was also addressed, at least in part, by § 813 of the
FY 2018 NDAA, which calls for agencies to make
more detailed disclosures when they debrief offerors
on major awards.
Conclusion—As a practical matter, if either
initiative—the “electronic portals” initiative under §
846, or the Section 809 panel proposals—ultimately
means that federal officials will be allowed to purchase commercially available goods and services
directly from commercial electronic marketplaces
without the prior publication normally required by
FAR pt. 5, that streamlined procedure could exempt
billions of procurement dollars from accountability
in the bid protest process. That, in turn, could have
serious consequences, only some of which are fully
foreseeable.
For the reasons outlined above, sharply reducing
bid protests could prove harmful. Whether through
the “electronic portals” contemplated by § 846 or
through the Section 809 panel’s proposed reforms,
exempting billions of dollars of procurement from
pre-award protests would run counter to a tradition
of accountability in federal procurement, and could
raise new risks of corruption in federal procurement.
Efforts to curb bid protests could run afoul of the
international agreements discussed above, both the
FTAs (including the GPA) and the reciprocal defense
5
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procurement agreements with U.S. allies. Trading
partners might demand that their agreements with
the U.S. be rolled back to shield portions of their own
civilian and defense markets from protests, at least by
U.S. vendors; those changes could hurt U.S. exporters
facing unfair trade practices abroad, and open new
risks of corruption in foreign markets. More specifically, reopening negotiations on the reciprocal defense
procurement agreements to exempt certain defense
procurements from protest could have national security implications if foreign allies insisted on reducing
other forms of cooperation to offset reduced bid protest protections. The U.S. business community could
be further damaged if developing nations, taking their
cue from the U.S., exempted major portions of their
growing procurement markets from bid protests.
Finally, and least predictably, frustrated vendors
seeking to challenge errors or corruption in procurement might seek out other forms of legal relief, such
as investor-state disputes under bilateral investment
treaties which broadly guarantee foreign investors
equitable treatment. See, e.g., Transparency International, “Anti-Corruption and Transparency Provisions
in Trade Agreements” 11–12 (2017) (surveying literature on potential investor-state disputes regarding
procurement under bilateral investment treaties),
available at www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/anti_corruption_and_transparency_provisions_
in_trade_agreements. By streamlining procurement to
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erase pre-award protests, the proposed reforms could
launch new and disruptive forms of legal challenges.
Proposals to streamline procurement by eliminating steps of the traditional procurement process
are not new; they arose, for example, when the Federal Government first considered allowing officials
to buy using purchase cards, and more broadly when
FAR pt. 13 was rewritten to permit more flexible
procedures for relatively small procurements. As the
waves of prior reform have shown, however, because
traditional protections have evolved organically over
time, their benefits are often not understood and the
costs of dismantling them can be unforeseen and
severe. Before the Government moves forward with
proposals that would reduce bid protests, careful consideration should be given to the potentially serious
costs of abandoning the protections afforded by protests—protections which have evolved over nearly a
century, and which are now a central and guaranteed
part of procurement systems, here and abroad.
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